Verifying the Architecture

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Main topics of the course

- Overview (1)
  - V&V techniques, Critical systems
- Static techniques (2)
  - Verifying specifications
  - Verifying source code
- Dynamic techniques: Testing (7)
  - Developer testing, Test design techniques
  - Testing process and levels, Test generation, Automation
- **System-level verification (3)**
  - **Verifying the architecture**, Dependability analysis
  - Runtime verification

Table of Contents

Learning outcomes

- Explain the activities and tasks in the typical architecture verification process (K2)
- List what system level properties are determined by the architecture (K1)
- Recall the analysis process in ATAM (K1)
- Perform fault effect analysis with fault trees and event tree analysis (K3)
- Identify how models can be used for performance evaluation (K1)

INTRODUCTION

Architecture design and languages

What is determined by the architecture?

What kind of verification methods can be used?

Architecture design

- What is the architecture?
  - Components (with properties)
  - Relations among them (use of service, deployment, …)
- Design decisions
  - Selecting components and specifying their relations
    - System functions by interactions of components
    - Hardware-software separation and interactions
  - Specifying properties of components
    - Performance, redundancy, safety, ...
  - Using architecture design patterns
    - E.g., MVC, N-tier, …
  - Re-use (off-the-shelf and available components)

Typical languages for architecture design

- UML
- SysML (e.g., Block diagram)
- AADL: Architecture Analysis and Design Language
  - Components
  - Relations: Data/event interchange on ports
  - Mapping to hardware
  - Properties for analysis

```
thread implementation CoinPublisher.impl
            calls(u: subprogram updateTotal;);
      properties

            Compute_Execution_Time => 30ms .. 40ms;
            Dispatch_Protocol => ( Sporadic );
            annex behavior {**
                  compute(5ms);
                  compute(10ms);
                  compute(15ms);
                  raise(availableContent);
            **};
end CoinPublisher.impl;
```



Typical languages for architecture design: SysML



Typical languages for architecture design: AADL

AADL: Architecture Analysis and Design Language (v2: 2009)

- For embedded systems (SAE)

- **Software components**
  - System: Hierarchic structure of components
  - Process: Protected address range
  - Thread group: Logic group of threads
  - Thread: Concurrently schedulable execution un
  - Data: Sharable data
  - Subprogram: Sequential, callable code unit



Typical languages for architecture design: AADL

- **Hardware components**
  - Processor, Virtual Processor: Platform for scheduling of threads/processes
  - Memory: Storage for data and executable code
  - Bus, Virtual Bus: Physical or logical unit of connection
  - Device: Interface to/from external environment
- **Mapping**
  - Between software and hardware
  - Between logical (virtual) and physical components



Typical languages for architecture design: AADL

- Example: Mapping between components



Typical languages for architecture design: AADL

- Relations
  - Data and event flow on ports
- Property specification for analysis
  - Timing
  - Scheduling
  - Error propagation (using an extension of AADL)
- Models in graphical, textual, XML formats



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end CoinPublisher.impl;
```

What is determined by the architecture? 1/2

- **Performance**
  - Resource assignment: Providing critical services, queuing of requests, parallel processing
  - Resource management: Scheduling of resources, dynamic assignment, load balancing
- **Dependability**
  - Error detection: Push/pull monitoring, exception handling
  - Recovery: Forward, backward recovery, compensation
  - Fault handling: Reconfiguration, graceful degradation
- **Security**
  - Protection of sensitive data: Authentication, authorization, data hiding
  - Detection of intrusion: Analysis of illegal changes
  - Recovery after intrusion: Maintenance of data integrity

What is determined by the architecture? 2/2

- **Maintainability**
  - Encapsulation: Semantic coherence
  - Avoiding domino effects of changes: Information hiding, error confinement, usage of proxies
  - Late binding: Runtime registration, configuration descriptors, polymorphism
- **Testability**
  - Assuring controllability and observability
  - Separation of interfaces and implementation
  - Recording and replaying interactions
- **Usability**
  - Separation of user interface
  - Maintenance of user model, task model, system model in runtime

Example: Architecture for software safety (EN 50128)

- Highly recommended techniques for SIL 3 and SIL 4
  - Defensive programming
  - Fault detection and diagnostics
  - Failure assertion programming
  - Diverse programming
  - Storing executed cases
  - Software fault effect analysis

  –> Software, information and time redundancy

Combination of techniques is allowed

Reference for error detection

- Not recommended techniques
  - Forward and backward recovery
  - Artificial intelligence based fault handling
  - Dynamic software reconfiguration

Example: Safety architecture in fail-stop systems



SCADA applications: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

Example: Safety architecture in fail-stop systems

Independent software "channels" with comparison at I/O and HMI



Summary: System properties and the design space

System property	Architectural decisions (examples)
Performance	Resource assignment, resource management
Dependability	Error detection, error confinement, recovery, fault handling
Security	Protection against illegal access, detection of intrusion, maintenance
Maintainability	Localizing, avoiding domino effect, late binding
Testability	Controllability, observability, separation of interfaces
Usability	Separation and maintenance of user, task and system model

Overview: What are the verification techniques?

- Review technique: Analysis of requirements and architecture related decisions
  - Architecture tradeoff analysis method (ATAM)
- Static analysis: Systematic analysis of the architecture
  - Interface analysis
    - Conformance of required and offered interfaces
  - Fault effect analysis by combinatorial techniques
    - Component level faults ↔ System level effects
- Quantitative analysis: Model based evaluation
  - Constructing and solving an analysis model for the evaluation of extra-functional properties
    - Computing system level properties on the basis of local (component of relation) properties

REQUIREMENTS BASED ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS

ATAM: Architecture Trade-off Analysis

Requirements based architecture analysis

- Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM)
  - What are the quality objectives and their attributes?
    - What are the relations and priorities of the quality objectives?
  - How does the architecture satisfy the quality objectives?
    - Do the architecture level design decisions support the quality objectives and their priorities? What are the risks?
- Basic ideas
  - Systematic collection of quality objectives and attributes: Utility tree with priorities
  - Capturing and understanding the objectives: Scenarios (that exemplify the role of the quality attribute)
  - Architecture evaluation: What was the design decision, what are the related sensitivity points, tradeoffs, risks?

ATAM conceptual analysis process



http://www.sei.cmu.edu/architecture/tools/evaluate/atam.cfm

Collection of quality objectives: Utility tree


Utility
Performance
Data Latency
(M,L) Minimize storage latency on customer DB to 200 ms.
(H,M) Deliver video in real time
Transaction Throughput
Modifiability
New product categories
Change COTS
(L,H) Add CORBA middleware in < 20 person-months
(H,L) Change web user interface in < 4 person weeks
Availability
H/W failure
COTS S/W failures
(L,H) Power outage at Site 1 requires traffic re-direct to Site 2 in < 3 secs
(M,M) Restart after disk failure in < 5 mins
(H,M) Network failure is detected and recovered in < 1.5 mins
Security
Data confidentiality
Data integrity
(L,H) Credit card transactions are secure 99.999% of time
(L,H) Customer database authorization works 99.999% of time

Quality objectives

Attributes belonging to quality objectives and their refinements

Scenarios for capturing (refined) attributes

Priority:
Low, Medium, High

Implementation complexity:
Low, Medium, High

Steps of the analysis (with examples)

- Analysis of the architectural support for the scenarios
  - Scenario: Recovery in case of disk failure shall be performed in < 5 min
  - Reaction as design decision: Replica database is used
- Analysis of sensitivity points
  - The use of replica database influences availability
  - The use of replica database influences also performance
    - Synchronous updating of the replica database: Slow
    - Asynchronous updating of the replica database: Faster, but potential data loss
- Analysis and optimization of the tradeoffs
  - The use of replica database influences both availability and performance – depending on the updating strategy
    - Tradeoff (architecture decision): Asynchronous updating of the replica database
- Analysis of the risks of tradeoffs
  - Replica database with asynchronous updating (as an architecture design decision) is a risk, if the cost of data loss is high
    - The decision is optimal only in case of given needs and cost constraints

The process of ATAM 1/2

1. Presentation of the method <- evaluation leader
2. Presentation of business drivers <- development leader
   - Functions, quality objectives, stakeholders
   - Constraints: technical, economical, management
3. Presentation of the architecture <- designers
4. Identification of the design decisions <- designers
5. Construction of the utility tree <- designers, verifiers
   - Refinement of quality objectives
   - Assignment of scenarios to capture objectives:
     - Inputs, effects that are relevant to the quality objective
     - Environment (e.g., design-time or run-time)
     - Expected reaction (support) from the architecture
   - Assignment of priorities to the scenarios (objectives)

The process of ATAM 2/2

6. Analysis of the architecture <- verifiers
   - Architectural support
   - Sensitivity points
   - Tradeoffs
   - Risks
7. Extending the scenarios <- stakeholders
   - Contribution of testers, users, etc.
   - Brainstorming: Aspects of testability, maintenance, ergonomics, etc.
   - Assignment of priorities
8. Continuing the architecture analysis <- verifiers
   - In case of scenarios with priorities that are high enough
9. Presentation of results <- verifiers
   - Preparation of a summary document

Advantages of ATAM

- Explicit and clarified quality objectives
  - Refinement of objectives, assignment of scenarios
  - Assignment of priorities
- Early identification of risks
  - Explicit analysis of the effects of architecture design decisions (model based analysis may be used)
  - Investigation of tradeoffs
- Stakeholders are involved
  - Designer, tester, user, verifier
  - Communication among the stakeholders
- Documenting architecture related decisions and risks

SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS

Interface analysis

Fault effects analysis

Interface analysis

- Goals
  - Checking the conformance of component interfaces
  - Completeness: Systematic coverage of relations and interfaces
- Syntactic analysis
  - Checking function signatures (number and types of parameters)
- Semantic analysis
  - Based on the description of the functionality of the components
  - Analysis of contracts (contract based specifications)
- Behavioral analysis
  - Based on the behavior specification of components
  - Behavioral conformance is checked (e.g., in case of protocols)
  - Precise behavioral equivalence relations are defined (e.g., bisimulation), also timing can be checked

Example: Interface analysis

- ”Contract based” specification of component functionality: JML

```
public class Purse {
    final int MAX_BALANCE;
    int balance;
      /*@ invariant pin != null && pin.length == 4  @*/
    byte[] pin;
      /*@ requires amount >= 0;
        @ assignable balance;
        @ ensures balance == \old(balance) – amount
                && \result == balance;
        @ signals (PurseException) balance == \old(balance);
        @*/
    int debit(int amount) throws PurseException {
      if (amount <= balance) {
        balance -= amount;
        System.out.println("Debit placed"); return balance; }
      else {
        throw new PurseException("overdrawn by " + amount); }}
```

- Matching interfaces on the basis of contacts (requires – ensures)

Analysis of fault effects

- Goal: Analysis of the fault effects and the evolution of hazards on the basis of the architecture
  - What are the causes for a hazard?
  - What are the effects of a component fault?
- Results:
  - Hazard catalogue
  - Categorization of hazards
    - Rate of occurrence
    - Severity of consequences

    → Risk matrix
  - These results form the basis for risk reduction



Categorization of the techniques

- On the basis of the development phase (tasks):
  - Design phase: Identification and analysis of hazards
  - Operation phase: Checking the modifications
- On the basis of the analysis approach:
  - Cause-consequence view:
    - Forward (inductive): Analysis of the effects of faults and events
    - Backward (deductive): Analysis of the causes of hazards
  - System hierarchy view:
    - Bottom-up: From the components to subsystems / system level
    - Top-down: From the system level down to the components
- Systematic techniques are needed

Fault tree analysis

- Analysis of the causes of system level hazards
  - Top-down analysis
  - Identifying the component level combinations of faults and events that may lead to hazard
- Construction of the fault tree
  1. Identification of the foreseen system level hazard: on the basis of environment risks, standards, etc.
  2. Identification of intermediate events (pseudo-events): Boolean (AND, OR) combinations of lower level events that may cause upper level events
  3. Identification of primary (basic) events: no further refinement is needed/possible

Set of elements in a fault tree

	Top level or intermediate event
	Primary (basic) event
	Event without further analysis
	Normal event (i.e., not a fault)
	Conditional event
	AND combination of events
	OR combination of events

Fault tree example: Elevator



Qualitative analysis of the fault tree

- Fault tree reduction: Resolving intermediate events/pseudo-events using primary events
  $\rightarrow$ disjunctive normal form (OR on the top of the tree)
- Cut of the fault tree:
  AND combination of primary events
- Minimal cut set: No further reduction is possible
  - There is no cut that is a subset of another
- Outputs of the analysis of the reduced fault tree:
  - Single point of failure (SPOF)
  - Events that appear in several cuts

Original fault tree of the elevator example



Reduced fault tree of the elevator example



Quantitative analysis of the fault tree

- Basis: Probabilities of the primary events
  - Component level data, experience, or estimation
- Result: Probability of the system level hazard
  - Computing probability on the basis of the probabilities of the primary events, depending on their combinations
  - AND gate: Product (if the events are independent)
    - Exact calculation: P{A and B} = P{A} · P{B|A}
  - OR gate: Sum (worst case estimation)
    - Exactly: P{A or B} = P{A} + P{B} - P{A and B} <= P{A} + P{B}
  - Probability with time function can also be used in computations
- Limitations of the analysis
  - Correlated faults (not independent)
  - Representation of fault sequences

Fault tree of the elevator with probabilities



EXERCISE Intrusion detection system

The intrusion detection system of a flat includes as detectors a door opening sensor, a pressure detector on the floor and a sound detector with an analogue sound filter.

These detectors are operated in a TMR structure with a voter component that is implemented using a microcontroller.

TMR:



Exercise:

- Draw up the fault tree that belongs to the undetected intrusion as the top level hazard. The basic events are the faults of the above mentioned components (these faults are considered as independent).
- Indicate the single point of failure (if any).

Solution of the exercise



Single point of failure: Voter fault, microcontroller fault

Event tree analysis

- Forward (inductive) analysis:
  Investigates the effects of an initial event (trigger)
  - Initial event: component level fault/event
  - Related events: faults/events of other components
  - Ordering: causality, timing
  - Branches: depend on the occurrence of events
- Investigation of hazard occurrence „scenarios”
  - Path probabilities (on the basis of branch probabilities)
- Advantages: Investigation of event sequences
  - Example: Checking protection systems (protection levels)
- Limitations of the analysis
  - Complexity, multiplicity of events

Event tree example: Reactor cooling



Event tree example: Reactor cooling



EXERCISE Evaluation of sensor subsystem

The temperature of a hot water storage is measured using two sensors.

- The two sensors may be faulty with probability p1 and p2, in this case they report the invalid temperature +255°C.
- The faults of the sensors are checked by the controller performing an acceptance check.
- The sensor with p1 fault probability is the primary sensor. The secondary sensor is read only in case of detecting the fault of the primary sensor.
- In case of a faulty sensor, the acceptance check always detects the fault.
  However, due to a program bug, the acceptance check detects a sensor fault with probability pe even in case of a non-faulty sensor.

Exercise: Evaluation of sensor subsystem

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- In case of a faulty sensor, the acceptance check always detects the fault.
  However, due to a program bug, the acceptance check detects a sensor fault with probability pe even in case of a non-faulty sensor.

Draw the event tree belonging to this system and calculate the probabilities of the scenarios.

The events:

- Initial event: Starting the temperature measurement
- Further events: Faults of the sensors, fault of the acceptance checking

Ordering of events:

Primary sensor	$\leftarrow$ may be faulty with probability p1
Acceptance checking	$\leftarrow$ may be faulty with probability pe (in case of a non-faulty sensor)
Secondary sensor	$\leftarrow$ may be faulty with probability p2
Acceptance checking	$\leftarrow$ may be faulty with probability pe (in case of a non-faulty sensor)

Solution of the exercise

Event tree:



Failure of the service at system level: pe·pe + pe·p2 + p1·pe + p1·p2

Cause-consequence analysis

- Connecting event tree with fault trees
  - Event tree: Scenarios (sequence of events)
  - Connected fault trees: Analysis of event occurrence, computing the probability of occurrence
- Advantages:
  - Sequence of events (forward analysis) together with analysis of event causes (backward analysis)
- Limitations of the analysis:
  - Complexity: Separate diagrams are needed for all initial events

Example for cause-consequence analysis



Example for cause-consequence analysis



Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

- Tabular representation and analysis of components, failure modes, probabilities (occurrence rates) and effects
- Advantages:
  - Systematic listing of components and failure modes
  - Analysis of redundancy
- Limitations of the analysis
  - Complexity of determining the fault effects (using simulators, analysis models, symbolic execution etc.)

Component	Failure mode	Probability	Effect
Temperature limit L detector function	> L not detected ≤ L detected	65% 35%	Over-heating Process is stopped
…	…	…	…

MODEL BASED EVALUATION

Model based performance evaluation

Model based evaluation

Goal: Evaluation of architecture solutions

- Analysis models are constructed and solved on the basis of the architecture model, e.g.
  - Performance model
  - Dependability model
  - Safety analysis model
- Modular construction of analysis models (possibly automated)
  - Architecture: Component and relations
  - Analysis model: Submodels (modules) for components and relations
- Solution of the analysis models
  - Local (component and relation) parameters are used to compute system level properties

Model based evaluation



Typical analysis models

	Performance model	Dependability model	Safety analysis model
Component parameters	Local execution time of functions, priorities, scheduling	Fault occurrence rate, error delay, repair rate, error detection coverage, …	Fault and hazardous event occurrence rate
Relation parameters	Call forwarding rate, call synchronization	Error propagation probability, conditions or error propagation, repair strategy	Hazard scenario, hazard combinations
Model	Queuing network	Markov-chain, Petri-net	Markov-chain, Petri-net
System properties (computed)	Request handling time, throughput, processor utilization	Reliability, availability, MTTF, MTTR, MTBF	System level hazard occurrence rate, criticality

Focus: Performance modeling

	Performance model	Dependability model	Safety analysis model
Component parameters	Local execution time of functions, priorities, scheduling	Fault occurrence rate, error delay, repair rate, error detection coverage, …	Fault and hazardous event occurrence rate
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Performance modeling

- Typical formalisms: Queuing networks
- Example: Layered Queuing Network (LQN)
  - Suitable for distributed client-server applications
- Model elements
  - Client submitting requests to (remote) servers
  - Servers (called “tasks” by convention)
    - Queuing of incoming requests
    - Entry points for service threads (called “functions”) with priorities
    - Forwarding function calls to other servers
  - Hosts (called “processors”)

Example: Layered Queuing Network (LQN)

Task (server):
- Functions (service call interfaces)
- Priorities

Client (request):
- Call rate



Processor:
- Deployment
- Scheduling policy

Function (service):
- Local execution time
- Call forwarding rate

Example: Performance modeling (LQN): Layers



Function (service):
- Local execution time
- Call forwarding rate

Function call:
- Synchronous / asynchronous

Computed system level properties (average and worst-case):
- Request handling time
- Task throughput
- Processor utilization

Example: Mapping architecture model to analysis model







Classes and objects with local parameters

Servers and deployment

Interactions (calls)

Example: Mapping architecture model to analysis model







Classes (objects)

Deployment

Interactions

Model transformation



LQN performance model

Example: Mapping architecture model to analysis model


UML Tool
UML Model (in XML format)
import perf. results into UML model
Analysis results
LQN Tool
UML to LQN Transformation
Performance Model

Architecture design patterns can be identified to assign analysis modules



Summary

- Motivation
  - What is determined by the architecture?
  - What kind of verification methods can be used?
- Requirements based architecture analysis
  - ATAM: Architecture Trade-off Analysis
- Systematic analysis methods
  - Interface analysis
  - Fault effects analysis
- Model based evaluation
  - Performance evaluation
  - Dependability modeling