

Example: Design tool with formal background

SCADE Suite

Safety Critical Applications
Development Environment


Esterel Technologies
(part of ANSYS)



Development of
embedded, real time,
safety-critical software
with formal methods
and integrated verification



Overview



**PROTOTYPE
& DESIGN**

Control Software Design



**Model
Checking**



**Formal
Verification**



**Debug &
Simulation**



**Rapid Prototyping
& Executable Spec**



**Model Coverage
Analysis**



**Time & Stack
Analysis**

**SCADE Suite
KCG
C & Ada**

**RTOS
Adaptors**



**Object Code &
Compiler
Verification**



**DO-178B
DO-178C
IEC 61508
EN 50128
ISO 26262
Certification Kits**


GENERATE

VERIFY

Applications of SCADE

Includes source code
developed in SCADE:


- Airbus A380, Airbus A340
- Boeing 787
- Dassault's Falcon 7X
- Ariane 5
- M51
- Eurocopter
- Z8 Helicopter
- Audi A6, A8
- PSA 407, PSA 607
- BMW, Honda Motorcycles
- ... and many more



Application domain: Embedded controllers

- Controlling/affecting physical processes
 - Sensors, actuators, control loop
 - Human-machine interface
- Behavior of controllers: Cyclic
 - Read sensor data → Process → Instruct actuators → Read sensor data...
 - Time-driven, event-driven or polling
- Design approaches:
 - Control-oriented design
 - Discrete control: Binary signals (e.g. change operation mode)
 - Finite-state automata (states, events, actions)
 - Data-oriented design
 - Continuous control: Signal processing (diff. equations)
 - Data-flow network (processor components, data paths)

Application domain: Embedded controllers



– Control design


- Discrete control: Binary signals (e.g. change operation mode)
- Finite-state automata (states, events, actions)

– Data-oriented design

- Continuous control: Signal processing (diff. equations)
- Data-flow network (processor components, data paths)


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
Formalism: Safe state machine

- States, restricted state hierarchy
 - No concurrent regions, transitions between hierarchy levels
- Restricted set of modeling elements
 - E.g. no history state
- Deterministic behavior (with proper restrictions)



Formalism: Data-flow diagrams


- Function blocks are elements of computation
- Directed arcs denote the direction of data flow
- Inputs are sampled periodically
- Outputs are computed and validated cyclically



Development of the SCADE language

- Formal language
 - Basis: the synchronous Lustre language (Univ. Grenoble, 1983)
 - More that 20 years of preliminary research
- Parallel definition of the SCADE language and its mathematically precise semantics
 - Interpretation of a SCADE model is independent of the tools
- Safety in the main focus since the beginning
 - The language was defined in cooperation with industrial partners (later users) and approval authorities


Support of the design process




Preserving semantics + certified code generator and compiler
⇒ modul/unit testing is not necessary (Airbus: 50%)

The SCADE Suite tool


- Graphical editor
 - Data-flow diagrams
 - Safe state machines
- Static analysis
- Simulation
 - Interactive and batch mode
 - Testing / debug functions
- Formal verification
 - Checking of properties
- Code generation
 - Ada & C
 - Qualified C: DO-178B Level A or MISRA conformance




SCADE model: different views on demand




SCADE model: different views on demand




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SCADE model: different views on demand




Example: Textual component



Textual description of behavior:

```
node counter (init, incr : int; reset : bool)
  returns (count : int);
let equa eq_counter [,]
  count = init -> if reset then init
                  else pre(count) + incr;
tel;
```



Example: Graphical component (block diagram)




Equivalent textual description:

```
count = init -> if reset then init  
           else pre(count) + incr;
```




Example: State machine component




State machine of the behavior (Moore):





SCADE block library



Analysis techniques: Simulation




Variable	Value
World/GUI_logic 1/SpeedSetPoint	740.8
World/GUI_logic 1/AltSetPoint	1097.3
World/Flight_Control 1/Control/elevatorCmd	1.556
World/Flight_Control 1/Control/throttleCmd	1.0
World/Flight_Control 1/Control/speedSensor	516.27
World/Flight_Control 1/Control/altSensor	165.45




Analysis techniques: Formal theorem prover engine

- Definition of properties: **Property** component (property node); output is either true or false
 - Describes correct behavior, e.g.
Aircraft_Altitude < 200 and not Landing_Configuration implies Alarm



Analysis techniques: Formal theorem prover engine

- Integration of property nodes into the design:
Inserted as **observer components** (observer nodes)



Analysis techniques: Formal theorem prover engine


To be proven: Output of observer component is always true

- Proof: Exhaustive search, counterexample-generation (SAT)


The screenshot displays the 'CruiseControl.Regul_ON' application window. On the left, a tree view shows the 'CruiseControl' component with its 'Inputs' and 'Outputs'. The 'Inputs' section lists: On (true), Off (true), Resume (false), accel (1.0000000), brake (0.0000000), and speed (31.000000). The 'Outputs' section is currently empty. The 'Locals' section is also empty. The main window displays the 'PPI Analysis Report' for the 'CruiseControl.Regul_ON' component. The report shows the following details:

Proof Objectives	
CruiseControl.Regul_ON	
Node	CruiseControl
Output	Regul_ON
Strategy	Default Prove
Mapping	None
Group	None
Result	Falsifiable
Scenario	scenarios/CruiseControl.Regul_ON_s0.sss [Load Scenario]
Translation time	0 s
Proof time	0.150207 s
Total time	0.150207 s
Assertions	none
Messages	none


Analysis techniques: Model-based testing




- Requirement-based test cases
- Model-based test coverage:
 - Has every element of the model been activated dynamically?
 - Untested functions can be discovered




Code generation: Based on the verified model



- KCG: certified code generator
 - DO-178B, IEC 61508, MISRA
 - No need for unit/model tests in case of generated code
- External or manually written code:
 - E.g. 3rd party software libraries
 - Testing is still mandatory!



Code generation: Based on the verified model



- **Compiler Verification Kit:**
 - Source code patterns
 - Test cases for compiled code patterns (all must pass)
- **To be verified:**
 - (Own) compiler
 - Execution platform

Manual Coding		DO-178B Processes				SCADE	
Verification	Verification of Verification					Verification	Verification of Verification
Review & Analyses	?		System Requirements Allocated to Software			Reviews & Simulation	Model Coverage
Tests & Analyses	MC/DC Code Coverage		Software Requirements			Suppressed	Not relevant
			Source Code				

Compare manual and SCADE verification

SCADE Suite: The “certified software factory”

