Verification of the source code


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


Budapest University of Technology and Economics Department of Measurement and Information Systems

Typical development steps and V&V tasks



Inputs and outputs of the phase



Overview: What is checked?

- Checking coding guidelines
 - Domain / platform / company specific rules
 - Well-known coding standards (guidelines)
- Checking software metrics
 - Estimation of quality aspects (e.g., maintainability)
 - Relation of metrics and fault-proneness
- Checking fault patterns by static analysis
 - Extensible tools
- Checking runtime failures by code interpretation
 Static verification of dynamic properties

Checking coding guidelines

Coding guidelines – introduction

- Set of rules giving recommendations on
 - Style: formatting, naming, structure
 - Programming practices: constructs, architecture

Main categories

- Industry/domain specific
 - Automotive, nuclear, ...
- Platform specific
 - C, C++, C#, Java, ...
- Organization specific
 - Google, CERN, ...

Coding guidelines in critical systems (standards)

- Programming style
 - Code formatting, comments, source code metrics
- Restricted constructs
 - Recursion, pointers, automatic type conversion, unconditional branch, ...
 - OO constructs: Polymorphism, multiple inheritance, embedding objects, runtime construction and destruction of objects
- Programming languages (e.g., in EN50128):
 - Analyzable, strongly typed, structured or OO language
 - SIL1-SIL4 HR: Ada, Modula-2, Pascal
 - SIL1-SIL4 NR: BASIC, SIL3-SIL4 NR: unconstrained C/C++
 - SIL3-SIL4 R: C and C++ with coding rules (language subset)
- Tools (compilers, libraries):
 - Certified, validated or proven-in-use

Example: Part of SoHaR guidelines (nuclear industry)

Group	Number	Guideline	
	1	Reliability	
	1.1	Predictability of Memory Utilization	
Specific	1.1.1	Minimizing Dynamic Memory Allocation	
Outside	1.1.2	Minimizing Memory Paging and Swapping	
	1.2	Predictability of Control Flow	
Specific	1.2.1	Maximizing Structure	
Specific	1.2.2	Minimizing Control Flow Complexity	
Specific	1.2.3	Initialization of Variables before Use	
Specific	1.2.4	Single Entry and Exit Points in Subprograms	
Specific	1.2.5	Minimizing Interface Ambiguities	
Specific	1.2.6	Use of Data Typing	
General	1.2.7	Precision and Accuracy	
Specific	1.2.8	Use of Parentheses rather than Default Order of Precedence	
Specific	1.2.9	Separating Assignment from Evaluation	
Outside	1.2.10	Proper Handling of Program Instrumentation	
General	1.2.11	Control of Class Library Size	
General	1.2.12	Minimizing Dynamic Binding	
General	1.2.13	Control of Operator Overloading	
	1.3	Predictability of Timing	
Outside	1.3.1	Minimizing the Use of Tasking	
Outside	1.3.2	Minimizing the Use of Interrupt Driven Processing	

C and C++ coding guidelines (rule sets)

- MISRA C (Motor Industry Software Reliability Association)
 - MISRA C:2004: 142 rules (122 mandatory)
 Examples:
 - Rule 33 (Required): The right hand side of a "&&" or "||" operator shall not contain side effects.
 - Rule 49 (Advisory): Tests of a value against zero should be made explicit, unless the operand is effectively Boolean.
 - Rule 59 (R): The statement forming the body of an "if", "else if", "else", "while", "do ... while", or "for" statement shall always be enclosed in braces.
 - MISRA C:2012: 143 rules + 16 directives
 - Rules: For static checking of the source code
 - Directives: Related to process, design documents
- MISRA C++ (2008): 228 rules
- US DoD, JSF C++: 221 rules (including code metrics)
 - "Joint Strike Fighter Air Vehicle C++ Coding Standard"

Example: Checking MISRA compliance

- Tools for checking MISRA compliance
 - o LDRA, IAR Embedded Workbench, QA-C, SonarQube, Coverity, ...

Options for node "evaluator7t"					
Options for node "even Category: General Options C/C++ Compiler Assembler Output Converter Custom Build Build Actions Linker Debugger Simulator Angel GDB Server IAR ROM-monitor J-Link/J-Trace TI Stellaris FTDI Macraigor PE micro RDI ST-LINK	Output Library Configuration Library Options MISRA-C: 2004 MISRA Image: Configuration Library Options MISRA-C: 2004 MISRA-C: 2004 Image: Log MISRA C-Settings Image: MISRA-C: 1998 MISRA-C: 1998 Set Active MISRA-C: 2004 Rules MISRA-C: 1998 Image: None Required All Image: 12.6: [advisory] The operands of logical operators (&&, and !) shoul Image: 2.7: Image: 2.7: [required] Bitwise operators shall not be applied to operands with the image: 2.8: Image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: [required] The unary minus operator shall not be applied to an image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: [required] The unary minus operator shall not be used. Image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: [required] The comma operator shall not be used. Image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: [required] The underlying bit representations of floating-point image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: [required] The underlying bit representations of floating-point image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: [required] The underlying bit representations of floating-point image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: [required] The underlying bit representations of floating-point image: 2.9: Image: 2.9: [required] The underlying bit representations of floating-				
Third-Party Driver					

Example: Compiler-dependent implementation

- Results of integer division depending on compiler implementation:
 - \circ (-5/3) may be -1 and the remainder is -2, or
 - $\circ~$ (-5/3) may be -2 and the remainder is +1
- Out-of-range results when adding or multiplying integers:

uint16_t u16a = 40000; uint16_t u16b = 30000; uint32_t u32x;	/*	unsigned short / unsigned int unsigned short / unsigned int unsigned int / unsigned long	? */
u32x = u16a + u16b;	/*	u32x = 70000 or 4464 ?	*/

- If the addition is implemented using unsigned short (16 bits) corresponding to the types of the operands then overflow may occur
- If the addition is implemented using unsigned int (32 bits) corresponding to the type of the result then there is no overflow
- These compiler-dependent implementations have to be validated (tested)

Checking software metrics

Software source code metrics

- Goals
 - Measurable characteristics of the source code
 - Linked with the quality of the source code
- Quality aspects for source code (MISRA)
 - Complexity
 - Maintainability
 - Modularity
 - Reliability
 - Structuredness
 - Testability
 - Understandability
 - Maturity
- Besides quality, costs can also be estimated on the basis of metrics
 - Cost of development, testing, maintenance

Example: MISRA metrics

	Software Attributes	Type of Technique	Area of Application	Technique or Metric	
	Structuredness	Method	Component Source Code	Interval Reduction	L
	of basic paths	Metrics	Component Source Code	Cyclomatic Number Essential Cyclomatic Complexity Number of Entry Points Number of Exit Points Number of Structuring Levels Number of Unconditional Jumps Number of Execution Paths)
which can possible p componer	nt." Cyclomatic	fetrics	omponent source Code	Cyclomatic Number Number of Distinct Operands Number of Unconditional Jumps Number of Execution Paths Number of Decision Statements IB Coverage DDP Coverage LCSAJ Coverage PPP Coverage	
Complexity: "Computed by reducing the control flow graph by systematically (from the inner parts) replacing structured code blocks			System Source Code	Number of Calling Paths Number of Components IB Coverage DDP Coverage LCSAJ Coverage PPP Coverage	
with a single node"			•	. "	

Example: Limits for MISRA metrics

Average number of	Software Metric	Area of Application	High Level Languages		Low Level Languages	
operators and			Min	Max	Min	Max
operands in statements	Average Statement Size	Component	2	8	N/A	N/A
oldiomonito	Comment Frequency	Component	0.5	1	1	1
CSC = Cyclomatic	Component Length	Component	3	250	3	250
Number *	Component Stress Complexity	Component	1	10000	1	10000
(Fan-In * Fan-Out) ²	Cyclomatic Number	Component	1	15	1	15
	DDP Coverage	Both	80%	100%	80%	100%
	Essential Cyclomatic Complexity	Component	1	1	1	1
Structured control	Hierarchical Complexity	System	1	5	1	5
flow graph (ESC=1)	IB Coverage	Both	100%	100%	100%	100%
	LCSAJ Coverage	Both	60%	100%	60%	100%
Average number of	Number of Calling Levels	System	1	8	1	8
components at call	Number of Calling Paths	System	1	250	1	250
levels in the function	Number of Components	System	1	150	1	150
call tree	Number of Decision Statements	Component	0	8	0	8
	Number of Distinct Operands	Component	1	50	1	50
	Number of Distinct Operators	Component	1	35	1	35

Categories of OO metrics

- Size: Counting source code elements
 - Number of code lines, attributes, methods (private/public/protected)
- Complexity: Cyclomatic numbers
 - CK: Max. number of independent paths in the control flow graph
 - Sum of cyclomatic complexities of methods
- Coupling: How many elements of other classes are used
 - Number of (directly) called methods
 - Number of classes with called method or used attribute
- Inheritance: Based on the inheritance graph
 - Number of levels below / above a given class, directly / all
 - Number of inherited methods
- Cohesion: Links among the methods and attributes of a class
 - Number of methods sharing (using together) an attribute
 - Number of methods calling each other

Correlation of OO metrics and fault-proneness (1)

- Goal: Prediction of the fault-proneness of classes
 - To support focusing the testing activities on risky classes
- Experiments: Measuring correlation of metrics and number of bugs detected in a class during testing
 - Open source projects were examined (Mozilla, 4500 classes)
 - Bugs recorded in bug databases were analyzed (Bugzilla, 230 000 bugs)

Inefficient metrics for fault-proneness prediction:

- Inheritance category
 - NOA: Number of Ancestors
 - NOC: Number of Children
- Cohesion category
 - LCOM: Lack of Cohesion in Methods: Number of method pairs that do not share attribute minus the number of methods that share

Correlation of OO metrics and fault-proneness (2)

Efficient metrics for fault-proneness prediction:

Coupling category:

- CBO (Coupling Between Objects): Number of classes coupled with the examined class (calling their methods, using attributes, or inherit)
- NOI (Number of Outgoing Invocations): Number of directly called methods
- RFC (Response Set of a Class): Number of methods of the class + directly called other methods
- NFMA (Number of Foreign Methods Accessed): Number of foreign methods (not owned and not inherited) that are directly called

• Size category:

- NML (Number of Methods Local): Number of local methods of a class
- LLOC (Logical Lines of Code): Number of lines that are not empty and not comment only

Checking fault patterns by static analysis

Pattern based tools




Types of static analysis tools

- Early tools: syntactic "well-formedness" checking
 Examples: Lint (for C, from 1979, Bell Labs), JLint (for Java)
- Static analysis tools looking for fault patterns
 - Built-in fault patterns (bad practice) + extensible by new patterns
 - Checking is not safe (false errors may occur)
 - Examples: FindBugs, PMD (Java), Gendarme (.Net CIL), ...
- Static analysis tools using abstract code interpretation
 - Computing the ranges of variables in program statements
 - Detecting arithmetic overflow, underflow, out-of-bound indexing etc.
 - Examples: CodeSurfer, CodeSonar (C/C++, template based), Prevent (MS Win API, supporting PThreads), Klocworks

Example: Fault categories and patterns in FindBugs

- Bad practice
 - Random object created and used only once
- Correctness
 - Bitwise add of signed byte value
- Malicious code vulnerability
 - May expose internal static state by storing a mutable object into a static field
- Multithreaded correctness
 - Synchronization on Boolean could lead to deadlock
- Performance
 - Method invokes toString() method on a String
- Security
 - Hardcoded constant database password
- Dodgy
 - Useless assignment in return statement

Example: Bug found by static checking (1)



JLint:

Verification completed: 0 reported messages.

FindBugs:


The parameter s1 to Main.chk(boolean, boolean) is dead upon entry but overwritten

Dead store to s1 in Main.chk(boolean, boolean)

PMD:

No problems found

Example: Bug found by static checking (2)



JLint:

java\lang\String.java:1: equals() was overridden but not hashCode().


Verification completed: 1 reported messages.

FindBugs:

Main.main(String[]) ignores return value of String.replace(char, char) PMD:

An operation on an Immutable object (String, BigDecimal or BigInteger) won't change the object itself

Example: Extension of PMD rules



- Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) based representation of the source code
- Rule to be checked at a given place of the AST

How to use static analysis tools

Integrate to build process

- Perform check before/after each commit, generate reports
- Use from the start of a project: Too many problems found at a later phase would discourage developers

Configure the tools

- Filter based on severity or category of rules
- Add custom rules

Review the results

- False positive: No errors found does not mean correct software
- False negative: An error found may not cause a real failure
 Ignore rule / one occurrence, with explanation

Checking runtime failures by code interpretation

Dynamic properties to be checked

- Goal: Detection of runtime failures without executing the software
- Failures to be detected include
 - Null pointer
 - Array index out-of-bound
 - Uninitialized data
 - Access conflict on shared variable
 - Arithmetic error: division by zero, overflow, underflow
 - Dangerous type conversion
 - Dead code (unreachable)
- Performed by control flow and data flow analysis
 - Calculate interval (range) for each variable
 - Propagate intervals based on control flow

Example: Detecting a runtime error by static analysis

- 20: int ar[10];
- 21: int i,j;
- 22: for (i=0; i<10; i++)
- 23: {
- 24: for (j=0; j<10; j++)
- 25: {
- 26: ar[i-j] = i+j;
- 27: }
- 28: }

Error: Out-of-bound array access in line 26

Example: The Infer tool

- Static analysis tool by Facebook
 - Focus on mobile code development
 - Users: Facebook, Instagram, Oculus, Spotify, WhatsApp, ...
- Android and Java
 - Null pointers, resource leaks
- iOS and Objective-C
 - Null pointers, memory leaks, resource leaks

```
Found 3 issues
./Root/Hello.java:27: error: NULL_DEREFERENCE
object a last assigned on line 25 could be null and is dereferenced at line 27
25. Pointers.A a = Pointers.mayReturnNull(rng.nextInt());
26. // FIXME: should check for null before calling method()
27. > a.method();
28. }
```

Example: QA-C, QA-C++ tools

Security Issues:

- Buffer under- and overflow
- Arithmetic overflow and wraparound
- Format string mis-use

Crash-Inducing Defects:

- Null pointer operations, invalid pointer values, operations on unrelated pointers
- Divide-by-zero
- Uncaught exceptions, throw-catch specification mismatches, improper exception use

Flawed Logic Issues:

- Invariant (always true/false) logic and unreachable code
- Unset variables
- Redundant expressions, initializations and assignments
- Infinite loops
- Return value mismatches

Memory Issues:

Memory allocation mismatches
 Memory leaks

API Mis-use:

Standard library pre- and post-condition verification


"A combination of SMT solver and in-house language and parsing expertise result in exceptionally accurate dataflow and semantic modeling of C and C++ code a foundation for a set of unique analysis checks."

How does code interpretation work?


Source code to be examined:

0: k=ioread32();	
1: i=2;	
2: j=k+5;	
3: while (i<10) {	
4: i=i+1;	
5: j=j+3;	
6: }	Risk: Division by 0.
7:	Is it possible?
8: $k = k/(i-j);$	What is the input resulting in division by 0?

Phase 1: Collecting information about the values of variables



Phase 2: Computation of the ranges (1)



Phase 2: Computation of the ranges (2)

- X5={(i,j+3,k) | (i,j,k)∈X4} X5={(i,j,k) | k∈[-2³¹, 2³¹-1], i∈[3,10), j=k+3i-1}
- X6= X5

X6=X5

X7={(i,j,k) | (i,j,k)∈X3, i=10} X7={(10,j,k) | k∈[-2³¹, 2³¹-1], j=k+29} j=k+5+3(i-2), and here i=10

X8={(i,j,k/(i-j)) | (i,j,k)∈X7} X8={(10,j,k/(i-j)) | k∈[-2³¹, 2³¹-1], j=k+29}

Error, if i-j=0, in this case since i=j=10, k=j-29=-19 X8_{error}={(10,10,-19)}


Analyzing dynamic properties

- Based on analyzing control flow and data flow
 Operations with intervals and constraints
 Loops: determine loop invariants
- Calculating loop invariants

 Hard problem (undecidable in general)
 Approximations are required
- Abstraction: over-approximating the intervals
 - All errors are detected
 - False negatives (errors) are possible
 - Can be treated as a hint for further analysis or testing

Illustration of abstraction

Problem: Division by (x-y); is x==y possible?



Example: Color-coded output of the PolySpace tool

static void Square_Root_conv (double alpha, float *beta_pt, float *gamma)

```
The Colors of PolySpace
  *beta pt = (float)((1.5 + cos(alpha))/5.0);
 if(*beta pt < 0.3)
                                                                                 Each function and operation is verified for
  *gamma = 0.75;
                                                                                 all possible values, and then colored accor-
                                                                                 ding to its reliability.
static void Square Root (void)
                                                                                 Green Proven safe under all operating
                                                                                 conditions. Focus your efforts elsewhere.
 double alpha = random float();
  float beta;
                                                                                          Proven definite error each time the
                                                                                 Red
 float gamma;
                                                                                 operation is executed.
 Square_Root_conv (alpha, sbeta, sgamma);
                                                                                 Orange Unproven.
 if(random int() > 0)
     gamma = (float)sqrt(beta = 0.75);
                                                                                          Proven unreachable code. May
                                                                                 Grev
  3
                                                                                 point to a functional issue.
  else{
     gamma = (float)sqrt(gamma - beta);
    if(beta > 1)
             alpha = 0;
```

Tools supporting code interpretation

- Abstract interpretation of code:
 - PolySpace C/Ada
 - Ariane 5 (70k lines of code), Flight Management System (500k lines of code)
 - o Astrée
 - Airbus flight control software
 - C Global Surveyor
 - NASA Mars PathFinder, Deep Space One
- Annotation based tools (design by contract): Loop invariants, pre- and post-conditions are given manually
 - ESC/Java (based on JML):

Annotation based synthesis of monitor components, test oracle

- E.g., jmlc+jmlrac, jmlunit
- Microsoft PreFix, PreFast, Boogie (Spec#, BoogiePL):
 Verification conditions (theorems to be proved) are generated and given to an external theorem prover

Summary: Techniques for source code analysis

- Manual review on the basis of checklists
 - Coding guidelines (e.g., naming conventions)
 - Typical mistakes (error guessing)
 - Analysis of the structure
 - Control flow checking: complexity, clear structure
 - Data flow analysis: looking for limits and boundary values
- Static analysis tools
 - Checking coding standards (built-in rules)
 - Checking the limits of source code metrics
 - Looking for fault patterns: Syntactic and possibly semantic faults
- Dynamic analysis tools
 - Checking potential runtime faults by code interpretation
 - Calculate and propagate the interval for each variable
 - Performance problems may also be detected