Verification of the Architecture Design

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Overview


Motivation

- Architecture design and languages
- What is determined by the architecture?
- What kind of verification methods can be used?
- Requirements based architecture analysis
 O ATAM: Architecture Trade-off Analysis
- Systematic analysis methods
 - Interface analysis
 - Fault effects analysis
- Model based quantitative evaluation
 - Performance evaluation
 - Dependability evaluation

Motivation

Architecture design and languages What is determined by the architecture? What kind of verification methods can be used?

Inputs and outputs of the phase







Architecture design

- What is the architecture?
 - Components (with properties)
 - Relations among them (use of service, deployment, ...)
- Design decisions
 - Identifying components and specifying their relations
 - Implementing system functions by interactions of components
 - Hardware-software separation and interactions
 - Specifying properties of components
 - Performance, redundancy, safety, ...
 - Using architecture design patterns
 - E.g., MVC, N-tier, ...

• Re-use off-the-shelf (OTS) and existing components

- UML
- SysML (e.g., Block diagram)
- AADL: Architecture Analysis and Design Language
 - Components
 - Relations: Data/event interchange on ports
 - Mapping to hardware
 - Properties for analysis





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AADL: Architecture Analysis and Design Language (v2: 2009)

For embedded systems (SAE)


- Software components
 - System: Hierarchic structure of components
 - Process: Protected address range
 - Thread group: Logic group of threads
 - Thread: Concurrently schedulable execution unit
 - Data: Sharable data
 - Subprogram: Sequential, callable code unit


System
Process
Thread group
Thread _
Data
Subprogram

- Hardware components
 - Processor, Virtual Processor: Platform for scheduling of threads/processes
 - Memory: Storage for data and executable code
 - Bus, Virtual Bus: Physical or logical unit of connection
 - Device: Interface to/from external environment

Mapping

- Between software and hardware
- Between logical (virtual) and physical components











Example: Mapping between components



- Relations
 - Data and event flow on ports
- Property specification for analysis
 - Timing
 - Scheduling
 - Error propagation (using an extension of AADL)
- Models in graphical, textual, XML formats



```
Compute_Execution_Time => 30ms .. 40ms;
Dispatch_Protocol => ( Sporadic );
annex behavior {**
compute(5ms);
compute(10ms);
compute(15ms);
raise(availableContent);
**};
end CoinPublisher.impl;
```

What is influenced by the architecture? 1/2

Performance

- Resource assignment: Parallel processing, queuing policy, deployment of critical services
- Resource management: Scheduling of resources, dynamic resource assignment, load balancing

Dependability

- Error detection: Push/pull monitoring, exception handling
- Fault tolerance: Static redundancy, dynamic redundancy, forward/backward recovery
- Fault handling: Reconfiguration, graceful degradation

Security

- Protection of sensitive data: Components for authentication, authorization, data hiding
- **Detection of intrusion**: Confinement of illegal access
- **Recovery after intrusion**: Maintenance of data integrity

What is influenced by the architecture? 2/2

Maintainability

- Encapsulation: Semantic coherence
- Avoiding domino effect of changes: Information hiding, confinement, usage of proxies
- Late binding: Runtime registration, configuration descriptors, polymorphism


Testability

- Assuring controllability and observability
- Separation of interfaces and implementation
- Recording and replaying interactions


Usability

- Separation of user interface
- Maintenance of user model, task model, system model in runtime

Example: Safety architecture 1/2



Example: Safety architecture 2/2



Summary: System properties and the design space

System property	Related design decisions (examples)
Performance	Resource assignment, resource management
Dependability	Error detection, fault tolerance and fault handling with redundancy
Security	Protection against illegal access, detection of intrusion, recovery
Maintainability	Encapsulation, avoiding domino effect, late binding
Testability	Controllability, observability, separation of interfaces
Usability	Separation and maintenance of user, task and system models

Overview: What are the verification techniques?

- Review: Analysis of requirements and architecture related decisions
 - Architecture trade-off analysis (ATAM)
- Static analysis: Systematic architecture analysis
 O Interface analysis
 - Conformance of required and offered interfaces
 - Fault effect analysis by combinational techniques
 - Component level faults ↔ System level effects
- Quantitative analysis: Model based evaluation
 - Evaluation of extra-functional properties by constructing and solving an analysis model
 - Computing system level properties on the basis of the local properties of components and relations


Analysis of requirements and architecture related decisions

ATAM: Architecture Trade-off Analysis

Requirements based architecture analysis

- Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM) goals
 - What are the quality objectives and their attributes?
 - What are the relations and priorities of the quality objectives?
 - How does the architecture satisfy the quality objectives?
 - Do the architecture level design decisions support the quality objectives and their priorities? What are the related risks?
 - Basic ideas
 - Systematic collection of quality objectives and attributes: Utility tree with priorities
 - Capturing and understanding the objectives:
 Scenarios (that exemplify the role of the quality attribute)
 - Architecture evaluation: What was the design decision, what are the related sensitivity points, tradeoffs, risks?


ATAM conceptual analysis process




http://www.sei.cmu.edu/architecture/tools/evaluate/atam.cfm

Collection of quality objectives: Utility tree structure

- Utility divided to quality objectives
- Quality objective is characterized by attributes
- Attributes are exemplified by scenarios



Collection of quality objectives: Utility tree



Steps of the analysis – with examples

- Analysis of the architectural support for the scenarios
 - Scenario: Recovery in case of disk failure shall be performed in < 5 min
 - Reaction as design decision: Replica database is used
- Analysis of sensitivity points
 - The use of replica database influences availability
 - The use of replica database influences also performance
 - Synchronous updating of the replica database: Slow
 - Asynchronous updating of the replica database: Faster, but potential data loss
- Analysis and optimization of the tradeoffs
 - The use of replica database influences both availability and performance depending on the updating strategy
 - Tradeoff (decision): Asynchronous updating of the replica database
- Analysis of the risks of tradeoffs
 - Replica database with asynchronous updating (as an architecture design decision) is a risk, if the cost of data loss is high
 - The decision is optimal only in context of the given needs and costs constraints

The process of ATAM 1/2

- 1. Presentation of the method
- 2. Presentation of business drivers
 - Functions, quality objectives, stakeholders
 - Constraints: technical, economical, management
- 3. Presentation of the architecture
- 4. Identification of the design decisions
- 5. Construction of the utility tree
 - Refinement of quality objectives and attributes
 - Assignment of scenarios to capture objectives
 - Inputs, effects that are relevant to the quality objective
 - Environment (e.g., design-time or run-time)
 - Expected reaction (support) from the architecture
 - Assignment of priorities to the scenarios (objectives)

- <- evaluation leader
- <- development leader

<- designers

<- designers

<- designers, verifiers

The process of ATAM 2/2

- 6. Analysis of the architecture
 - Architectural support
 - Sensitivity points
 - Tradeoffs
 - o Risks
- 7. Extending the scenarios
 - Contribution of testers, users, etc.
 - Brainstorming: Aspects of testability, maintenance, ergonomics, etc.
 - Assignment of priorities
- 8. Continuing the architecture analysis <- verifiers
 - In case of scenarios with priorities that are high enough
- 9. Presentation of results
 - Preparation of a summary document

<- stakeholders

<- verifiers



Advantages of ATAM

- Quality objectives are explicit and clarified
 - Refinement of objectives, assignment of scenarios
 - Assignment of priorities
- Early identification of risks
 - Explicit analysis of the effects of architecture design decisions (model based analysis may be used)
 - Investigation of tradeoffs
- Stakeholders are involved
 - Designer, tester, user, verifier
 - Communication among the stakeholders
- Documenting architecture related decisions and risks

Systematic analysis methods

1. Interface analysis

2. Fault effects analysis

1. Interface analysis

Goals

- Checking the conformance of component interfaces
- Completeness: Systematic coverage of relations and interfaces

Syntactic analysis

Checking function signatures (number and types of parameters)

Semantic analysis

- Based on the description of the functionality of the components
- Analysis of contracts (contract based specifications)

Behavioral analysis

- Based on the behavior specification of components
- Behavioral conformance is checked (e.g., in case of protocols)
- Precise behavioral equivalence relations are defined (e.g., bisimulation), also timing can be checked

Example: Interface analysis


"Contract-based" specification of component functionality: JML

```
public class Purse {
   final int MAX BALANCE;
   int balance;
    /*@ invariant pin != null && pin.length == 4 @*/
   byte[] pin;
    /*@ requires amount >= 0;
       @ assignable balance;
       @ ensures balance == \old(balance) - amount
    && \result == balance;
       @ signals (PurseException) balance == \old(balance);
       @*/
   int debit(int amount) throws PurseException {
     if (amount <= balance) {
       balance -= amount:
       System.out.println("Debit placed"); return balance; }
     else {
       throw new PurseException("overdrawn by " + amount); }}
```

 Contract based tools: for proving of properties (EscJava2), runtime verification (jmlc)

2. Fault effects analysis

- Goal: Analysis of the fault effects and the evolution of hazards on the basis of the architecture
 - What are the causes for a hazard?
 - What are the effects of a component fault?
- Results:
 - Hazard catalogue
 - Categorization of hazards
 - Rate of occurrence
 - Severity of consequences
 - \rightarrow Risk matrix



These results form the basis for risk reduction

Categorization of the techniques

- Analysis approach:
 - Cause-consequence view
 - Forward (inductive): Analysis of the effects of faults and events
 - Backward (deductive): Analysis of the causes of hazards
 - System hierarchy view
 - Bottom-up: From the components to subsystems / system level
 - Top-down: From the system level down to the components
- Systematic techniques are used
 - A. Fault tree analysis
 - B. Event tree analysis
 - C. Cause-consequence analysis
 - D. Failure modes and effects analysis

2.A. Fault tree analysis

Analysis of the causes of system level hazards

- Top-down analysis
- Identifying the component level combinations of faults and events that may lead to hazard
- Construction of the fault tree
 - 1. Identification of the foreseen system level hazard: on the basis of environment risks, standards, etc.
 - 2. Identification of intermediate events (pseudo-events): Boolean (AND, OR) combinations of lower level events that may cause upper level events
 - 3. Identification of primary (basic) events: no further refinement is needed/possible

Set of elements in a fault tree





Primary (basic) event



Event without further analysis



Normal event (i.e., not a fault)



Conditional event




AND combination of events



OR combination of events


Example: Fault tree of an elevator



Qualitative analysis of the fault tree

- Fault tree reduction: Resolving intermediate events/pseudo-events using primary events → disjunctive normal form (OR on the top of the tree)
- Cut of the fault tree: AND combination of primary events
- Minimal cut set: No further reduction is possible
 Minimal cut: There is no other cut that is its subset
- Outputs of the analysis of the reduced fault tree:
 Single point of failure (SPOF)
 - Events that appear in several cuts


Example: Reduced fault tree of the elevator



Quantitative analysis of the fault tree

- Computing the probability of the system level hazard
 O Using: Probabilities of the primary events
 - (component level data, experience, or estimation)
- Computation is based on the combinations (gates) of primary events
 - AND gate: Product of event probabilities (if independent)
 - Exact calculation: P{A and B} = P{A} · P{B|A}
 - OR gate: Sum of probabilities (worst case estimation)
 - Exactly: $P{A \text{ or } B} = P{A} + P{B} P{A \text{ and } B} \le P{A} + P{B}$
 - Probability as time function can also be used in computations (e.g., reliability, availability)
- Limitations of the analysis
 - Correlated faults (not independent), fault sequences

Example: Fault tree of the elevator with probabilities




2.B. Event tree analysis

- Forward (inductive) analysis: Investigates the effects of an initial event
 - Initial event: component level fault/event
 - Related events:
 - Ordering: causality, timing
 - Branches: depend on the occurrence of events

faults/events of other components


- Investigation of hazard occurrence "scenarios"
 - Path probabilities (on the basis of branch probabilities)
- Advantages: Investigation of event sequences
 - Example: Checking protection systems (protection levels)
- Limitations of the analysis
 - Complexity, multiplicity of events

Example: Event tree of a protection system



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Example: Event tree of a protection system




2.C. Cause-consequence analysis

- Connecting event tree with fault trees
 - Event tree: Scenarios (sequence of events)
 - Connected fault trees: Analysis of event occurrence, computing the probability of occurrence
- Advantages:
 - Sequence of events (forward analysis) together with analysis of event causes (backward analysis)
- Limitations of the analysis:


 Complexity: Separate diagrams are needed for all initial events

Example: Cause-consequence analysis



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Example: Cause-consequence analysis



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2.D. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

- Tabular representation and analysis of components, failure modes, probabilities (occurrence rates) and effects
- Advantages:
 - Systematic listing of components and failure modes
 - Analysis of redundancy
- Limitations of the analysis
 - Complexity of determining the fault effects (using simulators, analysis models, symbolic execution etc.)

Component	Failure mode	Probability	Effect
Detecting that	> L not detected	65%	Over-heating
a temperature value is greater than L	\leq L detected	35%	Process is stopped
•••			

Model based quantitative evaluation


Performance evaluation

Model based quantitative evaluation

Goal: Evaluation of architecture solutions

- Analysis models are constructed and solved on the basis of the architecture model, e.g.
 - Performance model
 - Dependability model
 - Safety analysis model
- Analysis models are mathematical models
 - Capture how local parameters of components and relations influence system level properties
 - The solution of the model (= computation of selected model characteristics) provide system level properties
- Modular construction of analysis models (possibly automated)
 - Architecture: Components and relations
 - Analysis model: Submodels (modules) for components and relations

General approach for model based evaluation



Typical analysis models

	Performance model	Dependability model	Safety analysis model
Component parameters	Local execution time of functions, priorities, scheduling	Fault occurrence rate, error delay, repair rate, error detection coverage,	Fault and hazardous event occurrence rate
Relation parameters	Call forwarding rate, call synchronization	Error propagation probability, conditions of error propagation, repair strategy	Hazard scenario, hazard combinations
Model	Queuing network	Markov chain, Petri net	Markov chain, Petri net
System properties (computed)	Request handling time, throughput, processor utilization	System level reliability, availability, MTTF, MTTR, MTBF	System level hazard occurrence rate, criticality

Performance modeling


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Performance modeling: Formalisms


- Typical formalism: Queuing networks

 Servers, hosts, requests and replies, waiting queues
- Example: Layered Queuing Network (LQN)
 - Suitable for distributed client-server applications
- Model elements
 - Client submitting requests to (remote) servers
 - Servers (called "tasks" by convention)
 - Queuing of incoming requests
 - Entry points for service threads (called "functions") with priorities
 - Forwarding function calls to other servers
 - Hosts (called "processors")


Example: Elements of an LQN model



Example: Results of the analysis of an LQN model




Example: Layers in complex LQN models



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Example: Architecture model with interactions




with local parameters


deployment

(calls)

Example: Mapping architecture to analysis model



Example: Analysis workflow



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Model based quantitative evaluation

Supplementary topic: Dependability evaluation (requires the knowledge of Stochastic Activity Networks or Petri nets)


Dependability modeling

	Performance model	Dependability model	Safety analysis model
Component parameters	Local execution time of functions, priorities, scheduling	Fault occurrence rate, error delay, repair rate, error detection coverage,	Fault and dangerous event occurrence rate
Relation parameters	Call forwarding rate, call synchronization	Error propagation probability, conditions of error propagation, repair strategy	Hazard scenario, hazard combinations
Model	Queuing network	Markov chain, Petri net	Markov chain, Petri net
System properties (computed)	Request handling time, throughput, processor utilization	System level reliability, availability, MTTF, MTTR, MTBF	System level hazard occurrence rate, criticality


Example: UML based dependability modeling

UML architecture model

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Example: An extended architecture model





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Example: Elements of a SAN analysis model


- Stochastic Activity Network (SAN)
- Places: Represent conditions
 Valid if marked with a token

- Transitions: Events with cases
 - Occurrence of a case removes a token from each input place and puts a token to each output place
 - Rate of the event (or delay distribution)
 - Probabilities of different cases







Example: Analysis model of a hardware resource




Example: Analysis model of error propagation



Example: Analysis model of a task




Example: Analysis of hazard rate



Control flow checking coverage

Outcome: If the coverage falls below 50% then the SIL2 requirement (10^{-7} < Hazard rate < 10^{-6}) is not satisfied

Example: Summary of the analysis steps



Summary

Motivation

- What is determined by the architecture?
- What kind of verification methods can be used?
- Requirements based architecture analysis
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- Systematic analysis methods
 - $\ensuremath{\circ}$ Interface analysis
 - Fault effects analysis
- Model based evaluation
 - Performance evaluation
 - Dependability modeling and analysis