
Safety-critical systems: Architecture

#### Systems Engineering course

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### Overview of the goals





## **Previous topics**

- What we specified?
  - Safety function requirements: Function which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state
  - Safety integrity requirements: Probability of a safetyrelated system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions (i.e., without failure)
- Safety Integrity Level and component fault rates

   SIL 4: 10<sup>-8</sup> ...10<sup>-9</sup> faults per hour
   Typical electronic components: 10<sup>-5</sup>...10<sup>-6</sup> faults/hour
  - Typical software: 1..10 faults per 1000 line of code





# Goals

- Safety critical systems study block
  - Requirements in critical systems: Safety, dependability
  - 2. Architecture design (patterns) in critical systems
  - 3. Evaluation of system architecture

- Focus: Design of system architecture to ...
  - o maintain safety
  - handle the effects of faults in hardware and software components






# Learning objectives

### Architecture design in safety critical systems

- Understand the role of architecture
- Know the typical architecture level solutions for error detection in case of fail-stop behavior
- Propose solutions for fault tolerance in case of
  - Permanent hardware faults
  - Transient hardware faults
  - Software faults
- Understand the time and resource overhead of the different architecture patterns



# Objectives of architecture design



- Stopping (switch-off)
   is a safe state
- In case of a detected error the system has to be stopped
- Error detection is required

- Stopping (switch-off)
   is not a safe state
- Service is needed even in case of a detected error
  - full service
  - degraded (but safe) service
- Fault tolerance is required






### Typical architectures for fail-stop operation



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
# Objectives of architecture design





### 1. Single channel architecture with built-in self-test

- Single processing flow with error detection
- Scheduled hardware self-tests
  - After switch-on: Detailed self-test
  - In run-time: On-line tests
- Online software self-checking
  - Typically application dependent techniques
  - Checking the control flow, data acceptance rules, timeliness properties
- Disadvantages
  - Fault coverage of the self-tests is limited
  - Fault handling (e.g., switch-off) shall be performed by the checked channel





# Implementation of on-line error detection

### Application dependent (ad-hoc) techniques

- Acceptance checking
- Timing related checking
- Cross-checking
- Structure checking

- (e.g.: too low, too high value)
- (e.g.: too early, too late)
- (e.g.: using inverse function)
- (e.g.: broken structure)

### Application independent (platform) mechanisms


- Hardware supported on-line checking
  - CPU level: Invalid instruction, user/supervisor modes etc.
  - MMU level: Protection of memory ranges
- OS level checking
  - Invalid parameters of system calls
  - OS level protection of resources





## Example: Testing memory cells (hw)

States of a correct cell to be checked:




States in case of stuck-at 0/1 faults:




States in case of transition

fault: w0,w1 w1

States of two correct (adjacent) cells to be checked:




#### Testing: "March" algorithms (w/r)





## Example: Checking execution flow (sw)

Checking the correctness of statement sequence
 Reference for correct behavior: Program control flow graph



## Example: Checking execution flow (sw)


Checking the correctness of statement sequence

 Reference for correct behavior: Program control flow graph
 Instrumentation: Signatures to be checked in runtime

Instrumented source code:

- **a**: S(a); for (i=0; i<MAX; i++) {
- **b**: **S(b);** if (i==a) {
- **c**: S(c); n=n-i; } else {
- **d**: S(d); m=m-i;
- **e**: **S(e)**; printf("%d\n",n);
- f: S(f); printf("Ready.")









## 2. Two-channels architecture with comparison

- Two or more processing channels
  - Shared input
  - Comparison of outputs
  - Stopping in case of deviation
- High error detection coverage
  - The comparator is a critical component (but simple)
- Disadvantages:
  - Common mode faults
  - Long detection latency





### Example: TI Hercules Safety Microcontrollers




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### 3. Two-channels architecture with safety checking


- Independent second channel
  - Safety bag: only safety checking
  - Diverse implementation
  - Checking the output of the primary channel
- Advantages
  - Explicit safety rules
  - Independence of the checker channel







### Example: Elektra interlocking system



Two channels:

Logic channel: CHILL (CCITT High Level Language) procedureoriented programming language

Field Element Controller

Safety channel: PAMELA (Pattern Matching Expert System Language) rule-based language






### Typical architectures for fault-tolerant systems





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# Objectives of architecture design







## Fault tolerant systems

- Fault tolerance: Providing (safe) service in case of faults
  - $\,\circ\,$  Intervening into the fault  $\rightarrow\,$  error  $\rightarrow\,$  failure chain
    - Detecting the error and assessing the damage
    - Involving extra resources to perform corrections / recovery
    - Providing correct service without failure
    - (Providing degraded service in case of insufficient resources)
- Extra resources: Redundancy
  - Hardware
  - Software
  - Information
  - o Time

resources (sometimes together)





# **Categories of redundancy**

- Forms of redundancy:
  - Hardware redundancy
    - Extra hardware components (inherent in the system or planned for fault tolerance)
  - Software redundancy
    - Extra software modules
  - Information redundancy
    - Extra information (e.g., error correcting codes)
  - Time redundancy
    - Repeated execution (to handle transient faults)
- Types of redundancy
  - Cold: The redundant component is inactive in fault-free case
  - Warm: The redundant component has reduced load
  - Hot: The redundant component is active in fault-free case





# Overview: How to use the redundancy?

- Hardware design faults: (< 1%)</li>
   Hardware redundancy with design diversity
- Hardware permanent operational faults: (~ 20%)
   Hardware redundancy (e.g.: redundant processor)
- Hardware transient operational faults: (~70-80%)
   Time redundancy (e.g.: instruction retry)
   Information redundancy (e.g.: error correcting codes)
   Software redundancy (e.g.: recovery from saved state)
- Software design faults: (~ 10%)
  - Software redundancy with design diversity







### 1. Fault tolerance for hardware permanent faults

With diversity in case of considering design faults

#### Replication:

- Duplication with diagnostics:
  - Error detection by comparison
  - With diagnostic unit: Fault tolerance by switch-over
- TMR: Triple Modular Redundancy
  - Masking the failure by majority voting
  - Voter is a critical component (but simple)
- NMR: N-modular redundancy
  - Masking the failure by majority voting
  - Mission critical systems: Surviving the mission time







### 2. Fault tolerance for transient hardware faults

- Approach: Fault tolerance implemented by software
  - Detecting the error
  - Setting a fault-free state by handling the fault effects
  - Continuing the execution from that state (assuming that transient faults will not occur again)
- Four phases of operation:
  - 1) Error detection
  - 2) Damage assessment
  - 3) Recovery
  - 4) Fault treatment and continuing service





# Phase 1: Error detection

- Application independent mechanisms:
  - E.g., detecting illegal instructions at CPU level
  - E.g., detecting violation of memory access restrictions
- Application dependent techniques:
  - Acceptance checking
  - Timing related checking
  - Cross-checking
  - Structure checking
  - Diagnostic checking


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## Phase 2: Damage assessment

 Motivation: Errors can propagate among the components between the occurrence and detection of errors



- Limiting error propagation: Checking interactions
  - Input acceptance checking (to detect external errors)
  - Output credibility checking (to provide "fail-silent" operation)
- Estimation of components affected by a detected error
  - Logging resource accesses and communication
  - Analysis of interactions (before error detection)





## Phase 3: Recovery

#### Forward recovery:

- Setting an error-free state by selective correction
- Dependent on the detected error and estimated damage
- Used in case of anticipated faults

#### Backward recovery:

- Restoring a prior error-free state (that was saved earlier)
- Independent of the detected error and estimated damage
- State shall be saved and restored for each component

### Compensation:


The error can be handled by using redundant information





## Types of recovery

State space of the system: Types of recovery



v1 state variable






## Backward recovery

- Backward recovery based on saved state
   <u>Checkpoint</u>: The saved state
  - Checkpoint operations:
    - Save: copying the state periodically into stable storage
    - Recovery: restoring the state from the stable storage
    - Discard: deleting saved state after having more recent one(s)
  - Analogy: "autosave"
- Limited applicability: Based on operation logs
  - Error to be handled: unintended operation
  - Recovery is performed by the withdrawal of operations
  - Analogy: "undo"



## Scenarios of backward recovery







### Phase 4: Fault treatment and continuing service

### For transient faults:

Handled by the forward or backward recovery

### For permanent faults:

Recovery is unsuccessful (the error is detected again)

• The faulty component shall be localized and handled

### Approach:

- Diagnostic checks to localize the fault
- Reconfiguration
  - Replacing the faulty component using redundancy
  - Degraded operation: Continuing only the critical services
- Repair and substitution





# 4. Fault tolerance for software faults

- Repeated execution is not effective for design faults!
- Redundancy with design diversity is required
   Variants: Redundant software modules with
  - diverse algorithms and data structures,
  - different programming languages and development tools,
  - separated development teams
  - in order to reduce the probability of common faults
- Execution of variants:
  - N-version programming
  - Recovery blocks






## N-version programming

Active redundancy:

Each variant is executed (in parallel)

- The same inputs are used
- Majority voting is performed on the output
  - Acceptable range of difference shall be specified
  - The voter is a critical component (but simple)








# **Recovery blocks**

- Passive redundancy: Activation only in case of faults
   The primary variant is executed first
  - Acceptance checking on the output of the variants
  - In case of a detected error another variant is executed





## Comparison of the techniques

Property/Type	N-version programming	Recovery blocks	
Error detection	Majority voting,	Acceptance checking,	
	relative	absolute	
Execution of	Parallel	Serial	
variants			
Execution time	Slowest variant	Depending on the	
	(or time-out)	number of faults	
Activation of	Always	Only in case of fault	
redundancy	(active)	(passive)	
Number of	[(N-1)/2]	N-1	
tolerated faults			





# Summary: Techniques of fault tolerance


#### 1. Hardware design faults

- Diverse redundant components
- 2. Hardware permanent operational faults
  - Replicated components: TMR, NMR
- 3. Hardware transient operational faults
  - Fault tolerance implemented by software
    - 1. Error detection
    - 2. Damage assessment
    - 3. Recovery: Forward or backward recovery (or compensation)
    - 4. Fault treatment
  - Information redundancy: Error correcting codes
  - Time redundancy: Repeated execution (retry, reload, restart)
- 4. Software design faults
  - Variants as diverse redundant components (NVP, RB)





# Redundancy in resources and time







# Software architecture design in standards

 IEC 61508:
 Functional safety in electrical / electronic / programmable electronic safety-related systems

#### Software architecture design

Table A.2 – Software design and development: software architecture design (see 7.4.3)

	Technique/Measure*	Ref	SIL1	SIL2	SIL3	SIL
1	Fault detection and diagnosis	C.3.1		R	HR	HR
2	Error detecting and correcting codes	C.3.2	R	R	R	HR
За	Failure assertion programming	C.3.3	R	R	R	HR
зь	Safety bag techniques	C.3.4		R	R	R
Зс	Diverse programming	C.3.5	R	R	R	HR
3d	Recovery block	C.3.6	R	R	R	R
3e	Backward recovery	C.3.7	R	R	R	R
3f	Forward recovery	C.3.8	R	R	R	R
3g	Re-try fault recovery mechanisms	C.3.9	R	R	R	HF
Зh	Memorising executed cases	C.3.10		R	R	НВ
4	Graceful degradation	C.3.11	R	R	HR	HR
5	Artificial intelligence - fault correction	C.3.12	() <del>-11</del>	NR	NR	NF
6	Dynamic reconfiguration	C.3.13		NR	NR	NF
7a	Structured methods including for example, JSD, MASCOT, SADT and Yourdon.	C.2.1	HR	HR	HR	HR
7b	Semi-formal methods	Table B.7	R	R	HR	HP
7c	Formal methods including for example, CCS, CSP, HOL, LOTOS, OBJ, temporal logic, VDM and Z	C.2.4		R	R	HR
8	Computer-aided specification tools	B.2.4	R	R	HR	HP

\* Appropriate techniques/measures shall be selected according to the safety integrity level. Alternate or equivalent techniques/measures are indicated by a letter following the number. Only one of the alternate or equivalent techniques/measures has to be satisfied.



