
Model Verification and Validation

Budapest University of Technology and Economics Fault Tolerant Systems Research Group





Budapest University of Technology and Economics Department of Measurement and Information Systems

Ariane 5 Booster

The strongest European booster





Ariane 5 Booster

- On 4 June 1996 it destroyed itself 37 seconds after launch
 - Four satellites were destroyed
 Loss of \$370 million








Ariane 5 Booster

- On 4 June 1996 it destroyed itself 37 seconds after launch
 - Four satellites were destroyed
 - Loss of \$370 million
- (One of the) world's most expensive software fault
 - Immediate reason:
 - Unsuccessful conversion between 64 bit and 16 bit number
 - Underlying reason:

Modules were never tested together



Example: Esterel SCADE





Static Analysis


Testing

Formal Verification

CONTENT




Motivation: Model Life Cycle



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Automatic Code Generation





Static Analysis


Testing

Formal Verification

BASIC CONCEPTS



Models and Activities



Control:

How can the desired state be reached?



Correctness

Correctness:

model/code fulfils the requirements


• Functional Correctness:

satisfying the functional requirements

 Checking non-functional requirements: see lecture on Performance modelling

Aspects:

- Always able to complete the task
- Error-free
- No forbidden behaviour





Classification of Functional Requirements

Allowed behaviour (e.g. safety):

- "Something bad is never true"
- What state can/can't be the current state of the sytem
- What behaviour is prohibited
- Universal requirements
 - They must always be true
- Expected behaviour (e.g. liveness):
 - "Something good eventually happens"
 - What states should be able to be reached
 - What functions should the system be capable of
 - Existential requirements
 - Possibility of fulfilling, potential reachability

Classification of Functional Requirements

Allowed behaviour (e.g. safety):

- "Something bad is neve
- What state can/can't be the
- What behaviour is prohibited
- Universal requirements
 - They must always be true

Expected behaviour (e.g. liveness):

- "Something good eventure has
- What states should be able to
- What functions should the syst
- Existential requirements
 - Possibility of fulfilling, potential r

"Traffic lights of crossroads can never all be green at the same time."


"The light should be able to switch to green."



Deadlock

Deadlock: A subset of the state space, which cannot be left by the system without external assistance.


o e.g. Processes waiting for each other





Deadlock


At crossroads – unless road signs or traffic rules tell otherwise – the vehicle coming from the right has right of way [priority]. (Road Traffic Act I, 1988)



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Unlocking the Deadlock


If 4 cars arrive to the crossroad at the same time, then one of them has to disclaim his priority, and let the others go. Otherwise they will stay there forever according to Highway code.





Unlocking the Deadlock


If 4 cars arrive to the crossroad at the same time, then one of them has to disclaim his priority, and let the others go. Otherwise they will stay there forever according to Highway code.





Another Deadlock

If 4 cars arrive to the crossroad at the same time, then one of them has to disclaim his priority, and let the others go. Otherwise they will stay there forever according to Highway code.



Unlocking the deadlock because of unlocking:


- Asymmetric algorithms
- Algorithms with randomization
 - See the backoff algorithm at Ethernet networks



Infinite Loop (livelock)

Deadlock: Another subset of the state space, which cannot be left by the system without external assistance.


- e.g. result of unlocking the deadlock
- $\circ~$ e.g. the Google car with the fixie





Deadlock


- Common design mistake at parallel systems
 - Often it is difficult to avoid or unlock it
 - The solution believed to be good can also cause problems
 - Difficult to test, may seem random
 - "Multi-core CPU crisis"
- Examples



- Two processes have to exchange messages but both are waiting for the other's message
- Both of two processes need two of the resources to continue, but each have reserved one




Model Verification and Validation





Types of Analysis

- By goal:
 - Verification:
 - Am I building the system **the right way**?
 - Is the implementation conformant to the specification?
 - Validation:
 - Am I building the **right system**?
 - Does the system satisfy the user requirements?
- By method:
 - Static analysis
 - Dynamic analysis
 - "spot check" (testing, simulation)
 - Complete (model checking)







Static Analysis

Testing

Formal Verification


STATIC ANALYSIS






Decision and Join

Is the following model correct?





Decision and Join



Join: only continues when tokens arrived from all inputs


→ DEADLOCK



Fork and Merge


Is the following model correct?

GYETEM





Fork and Merge



Merge: let tokens pass through from any branch
 Doesn't synchronize


 \rightarrow "Destock" is executed twice



Loop 1.


Is the following model correct?

(ETEM





Loop 1.



Join: only continues when tokens arrived from all inputs


→ DEADLOCK



Loop 2.


Is the following model correct?

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Loop 2.




Join: only continues when tokens arrived from all inputs






Is the following model correct?

YETEM






Is the following model correct?





Is the following model correct?




New frame in every iteration

Postprocessing each (many times – how many?)
 Borderline case...



Is the following model correct?
 O What about now?




New login after every login...
 o ...and a session...?

→ Faulty implementation "produces" threads



Terminating Node


Is the following model correct?





Terminating Node


Is the following model correct?





Terminating Node

Is the following model correct?






- Terminating node: stops the complete process immediately
 - The other activity won't be executed



Well Structured Process Models

 Lecture: These problems can be avoided by using well-structured processes



Static Analysis of Data Flow

- A process multiplies two numbers
 - Derived requirement:
 - "If at least one of them is even, the result will also be."
 - Can be traced through the code
 - "Executing in mind"

Symbolic execution

- Instead of concrete values of variables, the program is executed with sets of possible values
- Interesting inputs can be defined
 - E.g. Internal branches

 \rightarrow By what inputs can the branches be reached?



Static Analysis: Syntax Analysis

 Syntax analysis: modelling tools connect logically cascading model elements




- Syntax-driven editor
 - Fault during editing → Couldn't resolve reference
 - Advanced editor (offering possibilities for instance)
- Code and diagram together
- Programming: Modelling:

- after 1 s [clock>0]/ clock-=1
- ning: incorrect during editing g: correct during editing



Static Analysis: Structural Correctness

- Structural analysis: examining model graph
- Looking for error-patterns during editing
- Unreachable state, for instance:



 Further analysis: missing initial state, deadlock, variable assignment, etc.




Static Analysis: Supporting Design Rules

- Supporting design guidelines:
 Further rules can be added to the model
 - Always and Oncycle: Events firing on each clock tick
 Arbitrary frequence → Typically a malfunction

Using Always and Oncycle events are prohibited when using Yakindu.













МЙЕСҮЕТЕМ



MÜEGYETEM 178

Oracle:


producing and comparing expected results






Reference:

expected output based on test input





Model Testing Example: State Machine





MÜEGYETEM 17

Model Testing Example: Yakindu State Machine

Example test case: In Settings menu, the initial time can be set between 1 and 3 minutes on a 5 seconds scale.

<u>Inputs</u>


Examined automaton

Reading expected output




Model Testing Example: Yakindu State Machine

Example test case: In Settings menu, the initial time can be set between 1 and 3 minutes on a 5 seconds



Self Testing (Monitor)




Invariant property: must be continuously true

EGYETEM



Self Testing (Monitor)




Invariant property: must be continuously true

EGYETEM



Self Testing vs. External Testing




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


Self Testing Program





Self Testing Program




implementation or runtime error.

P

Monitoring in Yakindu

- SUT and monitor regions running paralelly
 - Good case:
 - Valid input
 - Correct operation

In the homework, one can switch between setting and playing.






Monitoring in Yakindu

- SUT and monitor regions running concurrently
 - Good case:

• Bad case:

- Valid input
- Correct operation

- Invalid input \rightarrow InvalidInput
- Incorrect output \rightarrow Error






Monitoring in Yakindu

- SUT and monitor regions running parallelly
 - Good case:

• Bad case:

- Valid input
- Correct operation

- Invalid input \rightarrow InvalidInput
- Incorrect output \rightarrow Error





- Executing the model: Simulation
 Analysing behaviour for given inputs
- Test case:
 - 1. Test input
 - e.g. a mid-range value and two corner cases
 - 2. Expected output





Coverage

- Coverage is the ratio of concerned model parts during the execution of a given test suite.
 - State coverage (in state machines):

reached states

all states

• Transition coverage (in state machine):

fired transitions

all transitions


Command coverage (in control flow):

executed activities

all activities




Example: Cloud-based Data Storage



"We are modelling cloud based data storage with only one file. The client can write the file, synchronize with the server and discard local modifications. Depending on the version of the replica on the server synchronizing may cause conflict if others have modified the file."




Example: Cloud-based Data Storage





Example: Cloud-based Data Storage






Coverage

After first test case: State coverage: 2/3=66% Transition coverage: 2/6=33%

After second test case:

State coverage: 3/3=100% Transition coverage: 4/6=66% After third test case: State coverage: 3/3=100% Transition coverage: 6/6=100%





Using Tested Models

Software testing:

- Reusing (100% coverage) test suite
- Covering test inputs (input)
- Outputs by model (expected output)
- Monitoring: simulating the model while running the software
 - Same inputs for the model and the program
 - Comparing outputs → fault detection

Log analysis:

Running the monitor over logged input/outputs



Using Tested Models

Before

running

running

After

running

Software testing:

- Reusing (100% coverage) test suite
- Covering test inputs (input)
- Outputs by model (expected output)
- Monitoring: simulating the model while running the software
 While
 - Same inputs for the model and the p
 - Comparing outputs → fault detection

Log analysis:

Running the monitor over logged inp

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Test Documentation

Test cases and test results should be documented!

- What does it test?
- o Based on what requirement?
- What is the input?
- What outputs are expected?
- Has it been executed?
- o If so, was it succesful?



Test specification

est report

- Exploring untested code lines and unsatisfied requirements
- Recording and tracing back the test results





Types, Phases of Tests

System Test

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Module testing:

separating and testing a component

Integration test:

testing multiple components together

System test:

Module/Unit Test

testing the complete system together

Integration Test

Regression test:

(selective) re-testing after modifications

Regression Test



Static Analysis

Testing

Formal Verification

FORMAL VERIFICATION





Formal Verification

- Formal verification: proving correctness of models/programs with mathematical methods
 - For more information see: Formal Methods masters course
- Tools:

Model checking

- Exhaustive examination of possible behaviours
- Automatic proof of correctness
 - Automatic theorem proving based on axiom systems
- Conformance testing
 - Checking compatibility between models



Model Checking

- Model checking: exhaustive (complete) analysis of possible behaviour of the model, based on given requirements
 - Search for erroneous operation

\rightarrow Counter example

Testing	Model Checking
Small set of possible cases	Complete
Checks expected outputs	Checks a sequence of states
Requires less computation	Requires more computation
Does not prove correctness	Proves formally

