


A Decomposition Method for the Verification of a Real-time Safety-critical Protocol

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Overview of the talk

- Safety critical systems
 - Case-study
- Background
 - Formal methods
 - Model checking
 - Temporal logic specification
- Verification approach
 - Decomposition method

Motivation: safety critical systems

- A system-level failure may result in
 - damage to people's health
 - serious environmental or financial harm
- Example:
 - Railway interlocking systems
- Characteristics:
 - Time-dependent behavior
 - Parametric behavior
- Ensuring **correct behavior** is crucial
 - In the presence of failures

Case-study

A master election and ID assignment protocol


The case study

- Protocol in a railway SCADA (*supervisory control and data acquisition*) system
- Ensures stable and fault tolerant communication between components
- Roles: MASTER-SLAVE
- Communication is performed in two layers:
 - the lower layer serves for administration,
 - while the upper layer transmits information between the components


The case study

- Protocol in a railway SCADA (*supervisory control and data acquisition*) systems
- Components:
 - *ETH* units [1 .. 4]
 - *LIO* units [0 .. 10]
- Goal:
 1. Election of a unique *ETH* master
 2. Assignment of unique logical addresses (*CIDs*) to *LIO*s

Management and administration





ETH module





- 3 channels for communication
- MASTER and SLAVE roles

ETH module




ETH module




SysML Model of master election and CID assignment

- Reducing the model to the master election and CID assignment



SysML Model of CID-assignment



Background


Verification

Formal methods

- Mathematical techniques for
 - Specifying systems
 - Hardware, software, continuous dynamics, ...
 - Reasoning about systems
- Advantages:
 - Applicable in early phase of development
 - Unambiguous
 - Automatic (?)

Model checking


- Automatic property checking
- Exhaustive exploration of the state space




- Advantage: generates counterexample

Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)


- Gp – p holds **globally** along all paths




- Fp – p holds in the **future** along all paths



- Example: FGp – **persistence** property




Timed automata



- Program graph +
 - Clock variables
 - Clock constraints
 - Invariants
 - Guards
 - Clock reset

Model checking timed automata




Verification approach

Contribution


Verification approach

- Goal: Ensure correct behavior in the presence of faults



Verification approach

- Goal: Ensure correct behavior in the presence of faults



Overview

- System modeled as a network of timed automata
- Fault model
 - **Transient faults** as unexpected change of state
- Goal of verification:
 - The system will **finally** work **correctly**

*FG (master election is successfull
&&
CID assignment is successfull)*

Verification approach


- Goal of verification:
 - The system will **finally** work **correctly**
- Battling state space explosion with decomposition
 - One property depends on the other
 - **Split** the problem into two subproblems
 - Apply **property-preserving simplification** to the systems
 - Both subproperties are persistence properties
 - **Strengthen** to a conjunction of two simpler properties

Modeling faults

- Consider faults that can be modeled as nondeterministic change of model state, e.g.
 - Loss, modification or creation of a message
 - Restart of a unit
 - Modification of a variable
 - ...
- Allow a finite number of occurrences

Fault abstraction


- Instead of modeling faults, we apply abstraction



- If the persistence property holds in the fault free model from any (initial) state,

Fault abstraction


- Instead of modeling faults, we apply abstraction



- If the persistence property holds in the fault free model from any (initial) state,
- It holds after any finite number of transient faults

Decomposition by FG-detachment

- Instead of checking $FG(p \wedge q)$,



- Check 1: $FG(p)$




- Check 2: $FG(q)$



Assume the system only has p -states

- This way, the system to be checked can be significantly reduced

Decomposition by FG-detachment




- Master election is not in the cone of influence
- *ETH1, ETH2, ETH3* is not in the cone of influence

Decomposition by G-detachment


- Instead of checking $FG\ p$,



- Check 1: $F\ p$, a p -state is reached



- Check 2: $G\ p$, Invariance condition holds




Decomposition by G-detachment

- Instead of checking FG p ,



- Check 1: F p ,

a p -state is reached




Assume the system starts in a p -state

Invariance condition holds



- Decompose an expensive query into two less expensive ones

Decomposition by G-detachment



Complete verification process

Assume
any starting state

ETH0 becomes master
eventually

G-detachment + reduction

Assume any starting state

Master election works as expected

FG-detachment + reduction

Assume any starting state

The protocol works as expected

Fault abstraction

Assume a finite number of transient faults may occur

The protocol works as expected

Assume
ETH0 starts as master

ETH0 remains master

Assume
ETH0 is master

Valid *CIDs* are assigned
eventually

G-detachment + reduction

Assume *ETH0* is master

CID-assignment works as expected

Assume *ETH0* is master
and assigned *CIDs* are valid

Assigned valid *CIDs* are
stable

Summary

- Modeled the complete system as a network of timed automata
- Formalized and applied decomposition rules to obtain smaller subtasks
- During verification, **discovered bugs** have been corrected
- The protocol has been successfully verified in UPPAAL
 - Each query completed in seconds (instead of OOM)